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Abstract : Adjudicative tribunals are an integral part of health system
governance, yet their real-world impact remains largely unknown. Most
assessments focus on internal accountability and use anecdotal methodologies;
few, studies if any, empirically evaluate their external impact and use these
data to test effectiveness, track performance, inform service improvements
and ultimately strengthen health systems. Given that such assessments would
yield important benefits and have been conducted successfully in similar
settings (e.g. specialist courts), their absence is likely attributable to complexity
in the health system, methodological difficulties and the legal environment
within which tribunals operate. We suggest practical steps for potential
evaluators to conduct empirical impact evaluations along with an evaluation
matrix template featuring possible target outcomes and corresponding
surrogate endpoints, performance indicators and empirical methodologies.
Several system-level strategies for supporting such assessments have also been
suggested for academics, health system institutions, health planners and
research funders. Action is necessary to ensure that policymakers do not
continue operating without evidence but can rather pursue data-driven
strategies that are more likely to achieve their health system goals in a
cost-effective way.

Introduction
Adjudicative tribunals are an integral component of health system governance.
Created by legislation, these quasi-judicial bodies are granted regulatory, oversight
and dispute resolution powers to promote fairness in health decision-making,
build confidence in health system management, strengthen governance structures,
*Correspondence to: Steven J. Hoffman, BHSc, MA, JD, McMaster University, 1280 Main Street West,
MML-417, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L8S 4L6. Email: hoffmans@mcmaster.ca
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and improve health services and patient safety.1 Their actual impact on the
health system, however, remains largely unknown. Most evaluations of their
work have focused on internal measures of accountability and independence
rather than external indicators of societal influence. When their effectiveness is
examined, assessors tend to utilize anecdotes from various experts and stakeholders rather than the rigorous empirical data that are almost certainly better
suited for the purpose. As efforts to reform health systems continue internationally, it will be increasingly important to truly understand the benefits,
costs and implications of adjudicative tribunals for providers and consumers of
health-care services as well as the institutional structures on which they rely. The
dynamic, independent and powerful oversight mechanism of administrative
bodies, and their dispute resolution potential, may only be realized with further
information on the ways in which they interact with the rest of the complex
health system and the impact they have within it. A strong and accountable
health system may depend upon it.
In this context, empirical evaluations are an opportunity to inform health
policymaking through the collection of objective data regarding the impact of
adjudicative tribunals on the health system. Such research includes both quantitative and qualitative investigations on the effects of enacted or proposed
interventions – including laws, regulations and policies – on economic, social or
health outcomes. Empirical evaluations may be distinguished from other types
of research by their reliance on data and use of the scientific method of inquiry
(Mello and Zeiler, 2008). Empirical study designs range from experimental (e.g.
randomized controlled trials) to quasi-experimental (e.g. interrupted time-series
studies) to observational (e.g. cohort, case–control and cross-sectional studies),
with data often gathered from surveys, interviews, focus groups, statistical
inventories, performance data or documentary analyses.
Empirical research, however, is not new to the health or legal spheres. For
health, experimentation, observation and the scientific method have at least
notionally been at its core for over a hundred years, with modern ‘evidencebased medicine’ (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992) even going as
far as prioritizing the ‘conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best
evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients’ over all other
possible inputs (Sackett et al., 1996). In the legal arena, empirical research has
also started to expand both in general (George, 2006) and in health-related
1 Adjudicative tribunals may be defined in a number of ways. This category could include (1) any
administrative body engaged in adjudication, including regulatory bodies whose principle function is
policymaking but who also engage in adjudication; (2) both administrative and judicial bodies, which
engage in adjudication; or (3) only those bodies whose primary or only function is adjudication. We adopt
the latter interpretation, but rely on studies and empirical approaches drawn from the regulatory and
judicial environment as well, with necessary adaptation to the sphere of administrative bodies whose
primary statutory function is adjudication. Ron Ellis, for example, has identified 27 of such tribunals in
the Province of Ontario in Canada that engage in ‘rights adjudication’ (Ellis, 2009: 77).
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studies specifically (Mello and Zeiler, 2008). However, when compared with the
health sphere, it is clear that empirical methodologies in studies of legal institutions have been relatively underutilized. Existing literature explains this
observation as a consequence of the complexity of legal interventions, the dearth
of large-scale accessible data sets upon which to rely and the heterogeneity of
legal interventions, which prevent natural experiments of cross-jurisdictional
comparisons (Mello and Zeiler, 2008).
In addition to these general challenges faced by all empirical legal researchers,
any attempt to evaluate the impact of a health-related adjudicative tribunal
faces additional hurdles. Not only has such an assessment never before been
comprehensively undertaken but the most suitable research methodology to do
so also remains elusive. Much of empirical health research, for example, relates
to patient outcomes and the costs associated with achieving these outcomes. In
the setting of adjudicative tribunals, these metrics may not apply. A proceeding
before a health tribunal may take place after the outcome for the patient already
has occurred, and for this reason the tribunals in fact may impose additional
costs on the health system without directly yielding improved health outcomes.
Although these additional costs may well lead to better practices and procedures
on the part of other actors in the health system (e.g. regulatory colleges,
insurance plans, hospitals), this type of benefit is indirect, may only become
apparent over time and is inherently difficult to measure.
Distinctions in statutory mandate and the absence of clear statutory language
setting out the purposes of adjudicative tribunals often leave no final target
outcomes against which services can be evaluated. Further, as creatures of statute
that serve quasi-judicial functions, adjudicative tribunals sit at the intersection of
the legal and health spheres. These tribunals operate within these two paradigms –
a dichotomy of process and outcomes – whose goals may sometimes diverge.
Indeed, these administrative bodies are expected to preserve the legal focus on
process, fairness and individual-level dispute resolution while at the same time
working to improve health-related outcomes by enhancing the overall effectiveness of the health system.2 The tension between a process and a substance-based
mandate presents distinct challenges for empirical evaluation, especially as evaluations of either dimension would be difficult. The complex co-dependence and
interconnectedness of these tribunals with the health system’s constituent elements
ensure that simple appraisal techniques cannot be effectively utilized. To the extent
that adjudicative tribunals have an impact on the health system – which has yet
to be empirically proven – this impact is likely linked to a host of other variables.
The fact that evaluation is not easy, however, does not detract from its importance.
2 Although this process–outcomes dichotomy between the legal and health spheres is certainly evident when comparing their respective research literature, it is important to recognize that both types of
work are conducted within both realms. Mello and Zeiler (2008), for example, highlight several sociolegal studies that gathered outcome-related data, and health researchers frequently address questions of
ethics and resource allocation that are more procedural in nature.
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The absence of comprehensive empirical evaluations on the impact of healthrelated adjudicative tribunals, and the potentially significant benefits of doing
so, certainly provides sufficient justification for further exploring this possibility.
Empirical research, for example, is one of the most accurate ways to systematically assess the population’s needs, capture stakeholders’ perceptions, test
the effectiveness of new initiatives and verify improvements over time. It
can help to identify areas of strength and weakness, point to opportunities for
growth or improvement, and facilitate a continual process of enhancements so
as to better serve the tribunals’ constituents and strengthen the health system.
Empirical evaluations may also allow for greater accountability for the investment of public resources in health-related adjudicative tribunals. They can help
to assess value for money and to determine whether and to what extent such
tribunals have any impact at all, which may be particularly important in light of
the recent global economic crisis and the austerity measures that have followed.
Despite these benefits and recognized importance, the evaluation and accountability of adjudicative tribunals is also one of the least scrutinized areas of
administrative and health law. The topic necessarily engages the issue of administrative independence, the statutory environment within which all adjudicative
tribunals operate, the policy priorities of government that funds tribunals, the
complexity of the health system and the role of the court in supervising healthrelated adjudicative tribunals through the mechanisms of judicial review. Evaluating
impact in the health sector is also necessarily a contextual exercise. As Peter Cane
observed in the administrative law context, ‘‘the impact of judicial review needs
to be studied in a contextualised way by reference to judicial review’s objectives and
functions. Also, it should not be assumed that, when we discuss the impact of
judicial review, we are all talking about impact of the same thing or, at least, of a
single institution with a single set of objectives and functions’’ (Cane, 2004; see also
Sunkin, 2004; Pearson, 2007). A similar approach is necessary for health-related
adjudicative tribunals but has never been systematically followed.
This paper aims to explore the context, challenges and opportunities for
empirically evaluating the impact of adjudicative tribunals in the health sector.
First, we will discuss the purpose, function and importance of these bodies
within the health system, including their statutory mandates and policy goals.
Second, we will examine the various ways in which their performance could
potentially be assessed and will justify why there is a need to develop empirical
approaches for the assessment of adjudicative decision-making. This part of the
study will be illuminated with examples from a focused scoping review of past
evaluations that we identified through searches in legal, medical and general
databases (i.e. Westlaw, Quicklaw, MEDLINE, Cochrane Library, Campbell
Library, Google Scholar), an existing review of empirical evaluations relating to
administrative tribunals (Partington et al., 2007) and other studies that were
already known to us and the various experts and colleagues we consulted.
Special effort was made to find empirical studies, with non-empirical works
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collected and reviewed as found. Third, we will identify the extensive barriers
to empirically evaluating the societal impact of adjudicative tribunals, which
we situate into three distinct categories: (1) complexity of the health system,
(2) methodological difficulties and (3) realities of the legal profession and the
environment in which it currently operates. Finally, based on this analysis, we
will advance what we believe to be the most constructive path forward for the
empirical assessment of adjudicative decision-making. We hope that this work
will encourage and inform future empirical evaluations of adjudicative tribunals
in the health sector that will help to assess their worth, improve their performance, enhance health decision-making, advance patient safety and facilitate
the achievement of population health goals. Such evaluations would also help to
confirm or dispel current beliefs and opinions on adjudicative tribunals, which
in most instances, including our own, are based predominantly on personal
experience rather than more objective and systematic assessments.
To enhance the utility of this paper for health policymakers in any context, each
of these sections will be brought to life by focusing on their application to two
prominent health tribunals in Canada, namely, the Ontario Health Professions
Appeals and Review Board (HPARB) and the Health Services Appeals and Review
Board (HSARB). Both HPARB and HSARB have statutory mandates to review
important health decisions that intimately affect the lives of their constituents.
Using these two bodies as case studies for exploring the context, challenges and
opportunities for evaluating adjudicative tribunals may enrich our understanding of
administrative tribunals throughout other sectors as well. More broadly, we believe
that this analysis may resonate with the experiences of health-related adjudicative
tribunals in other common law jurisdictions including the United States (e.g. U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services Appeals Board, Medicare Appeals
Council, California Department of Managed Health Care’s Independent Medical
Review Program), United Kingdom (e.g. Health Professions Council, Family Health
Services Appeal Authority, Mental Health Review Tribunal), Australia (e.g. Health
Professions Licensing Authority, Occupational Safety & Health Tribunal), New
Zealand (e.g. Health Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal, Pharmacy Board of
Appeal) and South Africa (e.g. Health Professions Council, Mental Health Review
Board). The various shared features among all adjudicative tribunals – including
their creation by legislation, use of delegated powers, dispute resolution services,
legal status and oversight function – ensures cross-border utility of this analysis and
the relevance of case studies from one jurisdiction to another.
The purpose, function and importance of adjudicative tribunals
in the health sector
Adjudicative tribunals are administrative bodies that are created by statutes and
that exercise delegated decision-making powers of the executive branch for the
purposes of achieving certain policy goals. They serve as an oversight mechanism
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for lower-level decision-makers and apply legal and normative principles to resolve
disputes between conflicting parties. They are independent – operating at arm’s
length from the government – and serve quasi-judicial functions otherwise fulfilled
by the formal judicial system. This independence, however, also has limits; their
members are appointed by the executive branch of government (in the case of
HPARB and HSARB, the power of appointment is effectively in the hands of the
Minister of Health), which also sets their staffing allowances and budgets. Their
decisions, although often final, must be authorized by their enabling statute and
are subject to judicial review by the courts. Governments pursue policies in relation
to these bodies for a host of reasons. The government may, for example, wish to
remove the need for court intervention, facilitate opportunities for settlement,
enhance access to efficient dispute resolution mechanisms or promote fairness.
In the health sector, adjudicative tribunals may be involved with resolving disputes
regarding medical malpractice claims, insurance coverage for health-care services,
determination of mental capacity, licensing decisions for health-care facilities and
patient safety procedures. They serve as an accountability mechanism that ensures
health decision-makers follow appropriate processes and act according to their
respective statutory mandates. Adjudicative tribunals aim to boost public confidence
in the credibility of decision-making within the health system, facilitate better and
more consistent decisions, and reduce the risk of errors that in this context can have
deadly consequences. Finally, they can help to promote independence, fairness and
justice within health care, militate against self-interest and corruption, and provide
opportunities to address wrongs through redress.
The HPARB, for example, is an integral part of Ontario’s self-regulating
health professional system. It helps to ensure that the health professions are
regulated in the public interest, that appropriate standards of practice are created and maintained, that patients have access to the health professional of their
choice and that they are treated with respect and sensitivity by health professionals. HPARB was established as a response to two related phenomena in the
late 1960s and early 1970s: first, the recommendation arising out of the Report
by the Honourable James Chalmers McRuer’s Royal Commission Inquiry into
Civil Rights, which emphasized the need for public interest oversight over selfregulating professional bodies (McRuer, 1968); and second, the Committee on
the Healing Arts tabled by the government on 28 April 1970, which also
emphasized the primacy of public interest regulation of health professionals
(Ontario Committee on the Healing Arts, 1970). Under the Province of
Ontario’s Regulated Health Professions Act (RHPA), people may appeal the
decision of a self-regulated health professional college to not pursue a disciplinary proceeding before HPARB.3 If the appropriate statutory processes
3 Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 3. Also see Steinecke, R. Looseleaf. A
Complete Guide to the Regulated Health Professions Act. Toronto: Canada Law Book. The RHPA is one
of several statutes administered by HPARB.
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were not followed by the relevant college, then the board is empowered to send
the matter back to the college for reconsideration. HPARB also hears appeals
from adverse decisions by the colleges in relation to registration requests.
The HSARB, similarly, is a part-time board providing oversight for the
decisions of various actors within the health system. Its broad jurisdiction arises
from 14 different statutes and includes reviewing decisions concerning payment
for health-care services under the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP), eligibility for housing in long-term care facilities, licensing of nursing homes and
other independent health facilities and the decisions of public health officials
(Pitfield and Flood, 2005).
Both HPARB and HSARB have a full-time chair,4 and a roster of part-time
members, some of whom have legal training (and in the case of HSARB,
medical training) and some who do not. Each board is supported by a shared
secretariat, which forms part of the Ontario Ministry of Health. Both Boards
have been held to be expert bodies by reviewing courts, which warrant
deference. Their substantive decisions may only be overturned if found to be
‘unreasonable.’5
As indicated above, a key aspect of evaluating tribunals created by statute is
to assess whether a tribunal is fulfilling its statutory objective(s). This may be
especially challenging, for example, if the specific goals of the relevant tribunal
are diffuse and ambiguous in their enabling legislation. Ontario’s RHPA, for
example, does not detail the purposes of the boards, so this must be inferred
from the powers and authority they have been provided. For example, HPARB
has the power to review decisions of regulated health colleges not to refer
complaints to discipline on grounds of the reasonableness of the college’s
decision and the adequacy of the college’s investigation.6 HPARB has broader
jurisdiction to review decisions by colleges to deny registration to applicants.7
Thus, although HPARB’s role is generally to ensure public interest accountability over decision-making by regulated health colleges, HPARB’s role in
reviewing complaints suggests a different purpose, and a more deferential
standard of review, than its role in reviewing denials of registration. Evaluation
needs to be responsive to these differences of statutory mandate.
Approaches to evaluating health-related adjudicative tribunals
Assessing the work of these adjudicative tribunals and others in the health sector
is an inherently complex enterprise. However, evaluations can be thought of and
categorized according to their orientation and methodology (see Table 1).
4 Since 2008, the same individual has served as chair of both boards.
5 See, with respect to HPARB, Botros v. Beadle (2007), 71 Admin L.R. (4th) 225, and with respect to
HSARB, Flora v. Ontario (Health Insurance Plan, General Manager) 2008 ONCA 538.
6 See s. 29(2) of the Health Professions Procedure Code, Schedule 2 to the RHPA.
7 See s. 22(1) of the Health Professions Procedure Code, Schedule 2 to the RHPA.

154

STEVEN J. HOFFMAN AND LORNE SOSSIN

Table 1. Categorizing questions about health-related adjudicative tribunals according to their
orientation and the possible methodologies that can be used to answer them
Methodology
Expert reviews
Orientation
Internal procedural
analyses

>

Are tribunal adjudications fair?

>

How many disputes are resolved?

>

Are procedures transparent?

>

>

Is there sufficient independence in the
body’s decision-making?
What management structures should
be in place?
Are there sufficient accountability
mechanisms in place?
What barriers exist to prevent potential users from accessing the services
of a tribunal?
What bottlenecks exist in the provision of services?
What steps can be taken to increase
the consistency of decision-making?

How many employees are needed for
optimal efficiency of operations?
What costs are involved?

>
>
>

>
>

External impact
evaluations

Empirical evaluations

>
>
>
>
>
>
>

How do tribunals interact with one
another?
How do they fit into the larger health
system?
To what extent do they affect the
work of the judicial system?
Do they provide sufficient opportunities for individuals to pursue justice?
Do they create a societal impression
that justice is obtainable?
What are some of the theoretical
benefits of these bodies?
How do they contribute to good
governance and accountability in the
health system?

>
>
>
>

>
>

>

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

What factors influence independence
and impartiality?
How satisfied are users with the body’s
operations?
What are users’ perceptions of the
quality of tribunals’ services and decisions?
What is the impact of having legal
representation for the parties?
How long is the average hearing?

What is the perceived effectiveness
and utility of tribunals among users,
stakeholders and the general public?
What impact do they have on decisionmaking and health outcomes?
Under what circumstances do they
positively influence the health system?
How do these bodies enhance health
care services?
Is their public confidence with the
services provided?
How can the tribunal increase its impact
on the community?
Were past initiatives effective?
What areas are most in need of
improvement?
What types of services are needed?

Examples of research questions that can be answered by empirical impact evaluations, the focus of
this paper, are located in the bottom right-hand cell of this table.

In terms of orientation, evaluations of tribunals can be focused on how they
function or what impact they have. The former would analyze the internal
operations of a tribunal while the latter would assess the body’s external effects on
a specified population. Procedural analyses are important to promote coherent
internal management structures, good governance, accountability, efficiency and
efficacy. External impact evaluations, on the other hand, represent a way to assess
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the real-world effectiveness of the adjudicative tribunal, its impact on others within
the health-care system and the benefits (or consequences) that this impact yields.
Such studies can determine whether or not these bodies support and/or enhance
the functioning of various health system institutions and decision-makers and
whether or not they ultimately influence service provision, access to justice in
the health sector and health outcomes. External impact evaluations require
expertise and independence – they are not traditionally conducted by auditors
(e.g. McCarter, 2008), ombudsmen (e.g. Marin, 2008) or internal staff (e.g. Health
Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, 2008).
Government evaluations of both health and non-health administrative bodies
tend to focus on issues related to internal operations rather than external
impact. The recent report of the Ontario Security Commission’s Fairness
Committee, for example, examined whether the agency’s internal governance
structure created a perception or reality of bias in its adjudicative responsibilities
(Osborne et al., 2004). The United Kingdom’s National Audit Office similarly
reviewed the procedures used by its Department of Work and Pensions to
medically assess incapacity and disability (National Audit Office, 2003a) and to
hear appeals of social security benefit decisions (National Audit Office, 2003b).
Some reviews examine particular problems that had previously been identified
(e.g. Blumenthal and Wessely, 1993; Blumenthal and Wessely, 1994; Society of
Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, 1995), while others focus on users’
satisfaction with a tribunal’s provision of services (e.g. Carscallen et al., 2003;
Confederation of British Industry, 2005; Employment Tribunals Service, 2005;
Aston et al., 2006). Several assessment efforts have even focused on the internal
operations of multiple tribunals or a jurisdiction’s entire tribunal system,
including the report of Ontario’s Agency Reform Commission (Guzzo et al.,
1998), the UK’s Leggatt Review of Tribunals (Leggatt, 2001) and the report of
the UK’s former Council on Tribunals (Adler and Gulland, 2003). Academics
also tend to focus on the internal operations of tribunals across various topics –
whether they regulate securities (Moyer, 1997; Rousseau, 2008), medical
malpractice claims (Siegal et al., 2008), denials of health insurance coverage
(Gresenz and Studdert, 2005), privacy (Jacobs, 2008), pensions (Sossin, 2007)
or determinations of medical incapacity (Peay, 1989; Bradley et al., 1995; Dolan
et al., 1999) – and often examine users’ experience (Genn et al., 2006a, 2006b).
While not a single governmental evaluation could be found that focused on the
external impact of adjudicative tribunals, at least one academic publication
discusses the potential benefits that administrative ‘health courts’ (which resolve
malpractice claims) can have on patient safety (Mello et al., 2006).
In terms of methodology, assessments of tribunals can either be conducted
through expert reviews or empirical evaluations. The first approach would take
advantage of the personal experiences and perspectives of an investigator while
the second approach harnesses the objectivity of the scientific method and the
generalizability of data that were collected from many people. Expert reviews rely
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upon the contextual and reflective expertise of the authors and are important for
probing the etiology of complex challenges within the tribunal system, raising
questions of possible concern or future inquiry, identifying structural problems and
possible ways to overcome them, justifying political decisions (either from the past
or those planned for the future) and suggesting recommendations for reform. This
approach is also more likely to have fewer costs and a faster completion timeline.
Empirical evaluations of tribunals, by contrast, seek scientific, evidence-based
methods and can be used to, inter alia, quantitatively or qualitatively assess their
impact on the health system, identify the factors that determine their successful
operations, and track perceptions of them over time. An empirical evaluation
may or may not lead to recommendations for reform. That said, these two
methodological approaches cannot in reality be so strictly distinguished. Experts
often utilize empirical methods and even the most scientifically rigorous and
objective evaluations must be interpreted by individuals (often experts in the field)
who may have stated or unstated agendas for reform.
Reviews of adjudicative tribunals have been conducted using both expert and
empirical methodologies. Prominent observers, academics and practitioners,
for example, have assessed various tribunals’ organizational structures (Moyer,
1997; Osborne et al., 2004), efficiency (Carscallen et al., 2003), accessibility (Adler
and Gulland, 2003), independence (Rousseau, 2008), performance standards
(Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, 1995), accountability (Allsop
and Jones, 2008) and overall effectiveness (Guzzo et al., 1998; Leggatt, 2001;
Thomas, 2005; Mello et al., 2006; Sossin, 2007). Other reviews feature empirical
elements such as (1) surveys that capture the perceived quality of services offered
(Employment Tribunals Service, 2005), stakeholder attitudes toward the tribunal
(Confederation of British Industry, 2005) and the functioning of a certain process
(Corsi and Hurley, 1979; Toubman et al., 1995; Latreille et al., 2004, 2005);
(2) interviews that probe users’ experiences with the tribunal (Aston et al., 2006;
Genn et al., 2006b), its perceived impartiality (Jacobs, 2008) and the effectiveness
of a particular procedure (Bradley et al., 1995; National Audit Office, 2003a;
Siegal et al., 2008; Urwin et al., 2010); and (3) performance data and documentary
analyses for examining key features of a tribunal’s caseload (Hayward et al., 2004)
and arrangements for how, when and why it makes appeal decisions (Peay, 1989;
National Audit Office, 2003b; Gresenz and Studdert, 2005).
The challenge in evaluating health-related adjudicative tribunals, therefore,
seems to lie at the intersection of orientation and methodology. Assessments of
adjudicative tribunals have focused on both process and impact, and have been
conducted using both expert reviews and empirical methods; yet, not a single
review could be found that empirically evaluated the external impact of an
adjudicative tribunal, despite extensive searching (see Online Appendix A for
27 examples of adjudicative tribunal evaluations listed according to these
categories). While this lack of research may indicate that such undertakings are
not important, interesting or possible, the evidence suggests otherwise: the need
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for external impact evaluations is evident (OECD Development Assistance
Committee, 1998; Hertogh and Halliday, 2004; Center for Global Development’s Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006; World Bank, 2006) and such
evaluations have been conducted with success in related settings, which also
involve the nexus of the health and law sectors and beyond (Jones et al., 2009).
The dearth of externally focused empirical evaluations is not only a missed
opportunity but it may also pose a significant risk. On the one hand, the lack of
an empirical rationale for the benefits of adjudicative tribunals may render
them vulnerable to opposition or simply to general cost-cutting initiatives. On the
other hand, ineffective tribunals may unjustifiably be receiving government
funding at the expense of other programs, which cannot be supported as a result of
limited resources. Without these data, adjudicative tribunals may also lack the
baseline measures needed to track changes over time, evaluate the performance of
decision-makers and staff, and engage in longer-term strategic planning.
Indeed, it is widely accepted that data-driven strategies are more likely to
help decision-makers achieve their goals in a cost-effective way than policies
pursued in the absence of evidence (World Health Organization, 2004; Maynard,
2006; Chalkidou et al., 2009; Hoffman et al., 2009). Information gathered by
health-related adjudicative tribunals like HPARB and HSARB through empirical
methods may be of particular interest to government officials as it can demonstrate
performance benchmarks and ensure that public funds are being invested and
spent effectively. If reform is called for, empirical data will be essential in
identifying what needs to change. For academics, it is an under-scrutinized
sphere of administrative law and health systems functioning that is both ripe for
research and, potentially, reform.
Challenges for empirically evaluating adjudicative tribunals in the
health sector
Yet despite the tremendous benefits, empirical impact evaluations of healthrelated adjudicative tribunals are not being conducted. This absence of assessment efforts is most likely attributable to the various challenges facing anyone
who embarks on undertaking such a project. These obstacles can be divided into
three categories: (1) complexity in the health system; (2) methodological complications; and (3) environmental realities in which the legal profession and
tribunals operate (Table 2).

Challenges with complexity in the health system
Empirically evaluating the impact of any adjudicative tribunal is a naturally
difficult enterprise as it requires the body’s various effects to be isolated from the
larger social context within which it operates. This is no doubt complicated for
tribunals in every sector because their activities are usually only indirectly
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Table 2. Summary of the complexity, methodological and environmental challenges associated with
empirically evaluating the impact of adjudicative tribunals in the health sector
Complexity challenges
>

>

>

>

>

Health system is multilayered, non-linear and
highly sophisticated
Countless independent
actors and institutions that
interact in unpredictable
ways
Nesting of sub-systems
throughout the larger
health system
Inaccuracy of mechanistic
‘‘cause–effect’’ relationships
Tribunals serve diverse
functions for various
players within different
contexts

Methodological challenges
>

>

>
>

>

>
>

Indirect relationship
between adjudicative tribunals and their existential
purpose
Absence of legislatively
defined desired outcomes
Evolution within tribunals
Difficulty in crafting suitable
goals that are observable,
measurable and testable
Cannot randomize potential users into different
‘‘treatment’’ groups
Few examples to emulate
No obvious data set upon
which to rely

Environmental challenges

>

Focus of legal sector on
process, administration and
oversight rather than outcomes
Concern for independence

>

Limited statutory mandates

>

Costs and resource limitations

>

Dearth of empirical training
and competence in the legal
sector
Diminished value of and
prestige for empirical legal
research within academia
Culture of deference to
authority and expertise

>

>

>

related to their existential goals. This challenge, however, may be further exacerbated in the health context due to its overwhelming complexity.
Indeed, health systems are increasingly being recognized as complex adaptive
systems that are multi-layered, non-linear and highly sophisticated. They consist
of countless sub-systems with immeasurable independent actors, established
policies, zealously guarded interests, entrenched professional ‘silos’ and divergent cultures that can all influence each other and even alter their external
environments. This web of elements, and the unpredictable interactions among
them, ensures that conventional mechanistic or ‘cause–effect’ conceptualizations
of the health system are inaccurate and oversimplifications of its complex
dynamics (Zimmerman et al., 1998).
While scientific knowledge has been greatly advanced by breaking big questions
into smaller ones that can be observed, analyzed and understood through rational
deduction, this process is severely limited when the studied phenomenon or intervention is located within a system whose constitutive parts are not independent,
constant or predictable. The fact that the health system exhibits characteristics
of distributed control, co-dependence and nesting of smaller systems within other
larger systems further aggravates this challenge and makes it difficult to fully
examine adjudicative tribunals without reference to other actors and institutions
(such as its adjudicators, staff, government policymakers, regulatory colleges,
relevant expert panels, the traditional court system and the public). Isolating
and attributing impact are further problematized by the fact that health-related
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adjudicative tribunals serve diverse functions according to various players within
completely different contexts (Plsek and Greenhalgh, 2001).

Challenges with research methodology
Yet in addition to the daunting barriers of evaluating adjudicative tribunals
caused by health system complexity, there are further methodological barriers
associated with such an undertaking. The primary challenge, as highlighted
above, is that simple research designs cannot be used to isolate adjudicative
tribunals and to elegantly locate causal inferences between them and their goals.
But above and beyond the various explanations illuminated by the complexity
perspective is the fact that efforts of adjudicative tribunals are only indirectly
related to their goals. Indeed, health services themselves only partially help meet
their goal of improved health for people. Any legal, regulatory or oversight
‘intervention’ that serves to better structure these services would be even further
removed from their ultimate goals. Empirical impact studies of such interventions must be expertly designed to account for this complexity.
However, even if simple methods did exist to observe the relationship between
adjudicative tribunals and their goals, there is currently a lack of clear evaluative
criteria against which particular adjudicative tribunals can be measured. This
is because their goals are not easily articulated and have thus not been defined
with adequate precision – if defined at all. Desired outcome measures are consequently absent, which ensures that suitable quantitative and/or qualitative
research methodologies cannot be matched to them. This problem, however,
cannot simply be overcome by brainstorming possible goals of adjudicative tribunals. Indeed, the existential purpose of these bodies may change and evolve
over time with new legislators, government policymakers, adjudicators and tribunal staff who can each contribute toward a shift in the focus and priority of
their operations over time.8 Various community stakeholders may also perceive
the role of a particular adjudicative tribunal in their sector very differently
depending upon their own mandate, ideological perspective and unique vantage
point. While reference to a tribunal’s enabling statute may be informative in
crafting an outcome measure, it is not always decisive. In the case of HPARB,
legislative provisions suggest that this body was created to ensure effective
regulation of the health professions in the public interest;9 yet, this goal is not
easily quantifiable. Indeed, the ability to empirically evaluate a complex intervention like a health-related adjudicative tribunal depends upon having a desired
outcome that is observable, measurable and testable against a null hypothesis.
8 For example, the evolution of Ontario’s HPARB over a period of 40 years was documented in the
tribunal’s formal submission to the Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council regarding interprofessional collaboration among health colleges and professionals (Health Professions Appeal and
Review Board, 2008).
9 Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 3.
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Some intended outcomes may be impossible to measure or may depend on
factors outside a tribunal’s control, such as how others respond to their decisions
and recommendations.
A desire to empirically ‘prove’ causal inferences between adjudicative tribunals
and a particular outcome is also complicated by the impossibility of randomly
allocating potential users of existing tribunals into groups that either receive or do
not receive their services. Randomized controlled trials – the most rigorous of discrete empirical evaluations (GRADE Working Group, 2004) – assess the effect of an
intervention on a test population in comparison with a theoretically identical
population. This method, however, requires properly constituted (i.e. randomized)
and adequately sized (i.e. large) treatment and control groups with both known and
unknown confounding factors evenly distributed between them in order to isolate the
impact of tribunal services and measure it against a benchmark. Non-randomized
retrospective evaluations comparing users of tribunals to non-users (or the situation
of the general public in jurisdictions with and without comparable tribunals) may not
be an ideal solution to this challenge as this creates a situation where user-status and
outcomes are measured at the same time. This makes causal determinations infinitely
more challenging and requires evaluators to systematically identify and control for
confounding factors in a separate process (Mello and Zeiler, 2008).
A penultimate methodological challenge for conducting external impact
evaluations of health-related adjudicative tribunals is that there are few examples of past efforts upon which to emulate. As previously mentioned, many
empirical studies have examined the internal processes of tribunals, but none
could be found that focused on their societal impact. This is exacerbated by the
dearth of obvious empirical data sets that can be analyzed and from which
potential evaluators can draw (Mello and Zeiler, 2008). Although hospitals may
be able to compare their patient population and its outcomes to those from
neighboring hospitals, adjudicative tribunals may not be in a position to continually collect data about their past users or to compare this information with
existing data sets from the same region or others.
Finally, the identity and background of the researchers evaluating the impact
of an adjudicative tribunal must also be considered. While the goal of empirical
study is to avoid bias and ideological assumptions, every researcher brings a
particular matrix of perspective, orientation, experience and values to their
work. Insiders, for example, may bring intuition and experiential judgment,
while outsiders may bring independence, fresh eyes and objectivity.

Challenges with the legal environment
As institutions that function within both the health and legal systems, health-related
adjudicative tribunals must also overcome the realities of the legal sector that may
not be particularly nurturing for empirical impact evaluations. For example, legal
actors are often focused more on achieving due process, transparency and good
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governance than specific societal outcomes (like improved health status, which is
the goal of direct clinical health care). Excellent process in the legal world is often
thought to be the most likely way to achieve the best outcome and may indeed be
constitutive of it in the absence of gold standards or clear benchmarks.
There is also greater concern for maintaining independence and avoiding any
apprehension of bias within the legal sector than in other areas. Like impartiality,
independence is a common law right of procedural fairness enjoyed by parties who
come before administrative bodies in common law jurisdictions (including
Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand). In Canada,
independence for adjudicative tribunals is based on the categories of judicial
independence identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Valente v. The Queen
(i.e. security of tenure, financial independence and administrative independence
over adjudicative matters)10 and applied to administrative bodies in Canadian
Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band – albeit in a more flexible and contextually
sensitive manner.11
Respecting this independence of adjudicative tribunals will naturally influence the
process and content of any evaluation in multiple ways. For example, independence
suggests that governments should refrain from evaluating tribunals’ substantive
decisions, lest reasonable observers reach the legally problematic conclusion that
tribunals may adjust their decision-making to align with what the government of
the day perceives as ‘successful’. Similarly, it may also be difficult for a tribunal to
establish evaluative criteria or outcome measures for itself as this might lead a
reasonable observer to conclude that the tribunal may pursue these goals at the
expense of fairness to the parties. This concern for independence even questions
the extent to which tribunals’ staff and members can be directly involved in any
evaluation for fear of influencing or interfering with their services that must remain
neutral at all times. In contrast to encouraging self-evaluation as is common within
the health sphere, the legal environment may actually discourage adjudicative tribunals from assessing their own external impact, especially as such undertakings
are not explicitly part of their statutory mandates.12
Finally, as recently highlighted by the Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal
Research, the legal academy also suffers from a dearth of empirical competence
and capacity to conduct such studies (Genn et al., 2006a). While the field of
empirical health law scholarship has recently grown exponentially (Mello and
Zeiler, 2008), it is generally accepted that the current capacity is inadequate and
10 Valente v. The Queen (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.).
11 Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band (1995), 122 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (S.C.C.). It should be
noted that these standards of independence that are relevant in the adjudicative tribunal context are only
a common law right, which may be displaced by statute, unlike judicial independence, which is a constitutional principle. See Ocean Port Hotel v. British Columbia, 2001 SCC 17.
12 On the other hand, a study that expresses respect for the adjudicative independence of tribunals
will likely have greater credibility and attract broader ‘buy in’ than a study that is perceived as inconsistent with it.

162

STEVEN J. HOFFMAN AND LORNE SOSSIN

that it may further diminish over time. Empirical legal methodologies are also
not generally recognized to be as prestigious within the academic community as
traditional doctrinal investigations (Genn et al., 2006a). The pervasive culture
of deference to experts and authority must further diminish the perceived value
of objective empirical work and weaken any apparent need for more rigorous
research that is higher on the hierarchy of evidence (GRADE Working Group,
2004). Again, the focus on elements of process (e.g. bias and independence)
rather than impact (e.g. judicial decisions) as indicators of quality and performance must also deter legal scholars from conducting work in this area such
that target outcomes are less likely to be assessed.
Reasons for optimism
However, despite the challenges faced by potential evaluators of adjudicative
tribunals, there is reason for optimism: each of the various identified barriers can
be overcome and have indeed been circumvented in similar evaluations. For
example, as previously mentioned, many empirical evaluations have been conducted that focus on the internal operations of these bodies. A major literature
review in 2007 highlighted much of the work that has been conducted and
published in this area (Partington et al., 2007). Yet in addition to these studies,
empirical evaluations have also been undertaken to assess the external impact of
similarly functioning specialty courts that operate within the judicial system.
A systematic review of the research evidence has even been conducted on the
societal impact of at least one type of these judicial organs (Wilson et al., 2006).
Indeed, methodologically, there may be much to learn from external impact
evaluations of specialist courts in the judicial sector (Plotnikoff and Woolfson,
2005). For example, ‘drug courts’ have been extensively evaluated in the United
States and in other jurisdictions regarding their ability to increase treatment
rates, lower criminal recidivism, and enhance cost-effectiveness of prosecution
(United States Government Accountability Office, 2005; Wilson et al., 2006;
Green et al., 2009). Domestic violence courts and community courts have
similarly been assessed for compliance, cost-effectiveness, conviction rates and
public perception, and mental health courts have been comprehensively examined for reducing criminal violence, enhancing community safety, conserving
fiscal resources and improving clinical outcomes (see Online Appendix B for a
list of 91 external impact evaluations of specialist courts). However, it must be
recognized that the context within which these judicial bodies operate is very
different from that of health-related administrative tribunals. Not only are they
part of the judiciary rather than the executive branch of government, but their
existential goals are usually related to diverting complex or special cases from
traditional courtrooms rather than supporting the infrastructure of a completely
different system (like that of the health system). Empirically tracking desired
outcomes like cost-savings and reduced reoffending rates will naturally be easier

Adjudicative tribunals in the health sector 163

in this context when the intervention or service is more directly related to its
goal. Yet, alternatively, it may actually be more difficult for these judicial organs
to evaluate themselves due to their strict separation from the executive (which
has the financial resources to fund such undertakings) and the likelihood of them
to zealously guard their independence.
Researchers seeking to empirically evaluate health-related adjudicative tribunals can also benefit from earlier accounts of similar efforts. For example,
Mello and Zeiler (2008) describe the diversity and comparative advantages of
various empirical approaches that have been taken by scholars in the health law
field to address issues as wide-ranging as medical malpractice reform and motor
safety laws. Furthermore, on the use of randomized controlled trials, for which
these two scholars are less optimistic, Pleasence (2008) provides an account of
such an undertaking in the United Kingdom, which highlights the many technical, practical and ethical barriers that were faced, and suggests ways to
overcome them in the future.
Opportunities for moving forward
Deliberate and concerted efforts, however, will be necessary to overcome the
numerous barriers to empirical impact evaluations of health-related adjudicative
tribunals among both individual evaluators and others that must support them.
The analysis of challenges described above points to several strategies that can
be pursued.
At the individual level, potential evaluators of adjudicative tribunals may need to
assemble interdisciplinary teams to obtain the necessary methodological expertise,
bring an aura of independence and credibility to their work, and save tribunal staff
from the potentially uncomfortable situation of relinquishing their perceived independence by evaluating their own performance. Like the process for assessing the
effectiveness of complex clinical interventions, evaluators of adjudicative tribunals
may then be advised to conceptually map out the way in which their tribunal
functions, its interactions and relationships with others in the health and legal
systems, and its potential effects on each of them (Campbell et al., 2007). This will
aid in focusing the inquiry, identifying areas in which little is known, generating
suitable research questions and determining the appropriate methodology.
Potential evaluators must also thoughtfully consider both the target audience
of their research and the overall goal that their particular health-related adjudicative tribunal is expected to help achieve, and then identify the most important
targeted outcomes that are relevant to the audience and important for the goal’s
fulfillment. When such outcomes cannot directly be measured, as may often be the
case, evaluators must identify strong surrogate endpoints, which are measurements
that reflect important outcomes even if they are of indirect or diminished practical
importance. Performance indicators can then be developed followed by the
corresponding methodologies for tracking changes to them (see Panel 1).
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Panel 1. Steps for moving empirical impact evaluations forward at the individual level
The following seven steps are a suggested sequence of actions that researchers, and/or tribunal staff
can take to empirically evaluate the impact of adjudicative tribunals in the health sector:
1. Assemble an interdisciplinary team of researchers that has the necessary methodological expertise,
independent aura and credibility among target audiences.
2. Conceptually map the way in which the adjudicative tribunal functions and its interactions with and
effects on others within the health and legal systems.
3. Identify the overall goal that the adjudicative tribunal is expected to help achieve and the most
important targeted outcomes that are necessary for its fulfillment.
4. Develop measurable surrogate endpoints and corresponding performance indicators that reflect
important outcomes.
5. Construct a realistic and ethical research methodology that is appropriate for tracking each surrogate
endpoint.
6. Conduct the empirical impact evaluation.
7. Disseminate findings widely to decision-makers who can act upon them and other researchers whose
work may be better informed by them.

In the case of Ontario’s health-related adjudicative tribunals, both HPARB and
HSARB can describe their overall goal as contributing to the health of Ontarians
by enhancing decision-making within the health system. If government officials are
the evaluation’s intended audience, targeted outcomes could include (1) confidence
in the health system, (2) equity, justice and fairness in health decision-making,
(3) strengthened health system institutions and (4) better health services and
patient safety via enhanced regulation and oversight. As these outcomes would
be nearly impossible to measure directly, surrogate endpoints can be developed
and could possibly include (1a) access to adjudicative mechanisms for dispute
resolution, (1b) perceived legitimacy of adjudicative decisions, (2a) satisfaction
with adjudicative services, (2b) perceived fairness and legitimacy of adjudicative
services, (3a) interaction among health system institutions and decision-makers,
(3b) existence of support mechanisms for primary health decision-makers,
(3c) effective oversight of primary health decision-makers, (4a) better decisions by
primary health decision-makers and (4b) respect for the tribunal’s oversight
function. Performance indicators and their corresponding empirical methodologies
could then range from the public’s awareness for the tribunal’s existence to the
perceived concern among primary health decision-makers that their decisions will
be reversed. Suggestions for inclusion as part of a government-focused, empirical
evaluation matrix of the external impact of health-related adjudicative tribunals
such as Ontario’s have been presented in Table 3 to illuminate this process in the
context of a real-world example. Evaluations of these bodies for other target
audiences such as regulatory colleges, insurance plans, hospitals, individual health
professionals or patients would likely lead to different measurable outcomes.
Once a system of empirical observation is in place, potential evaluators can
establish benchmarks according to which they can track and assess performance.

Table 3. Suggestions for an empirical impact evaluation matrix for Ontario’s health-related adjudicative tribunals
Targeted outcomes
Confidence in the health
system

Strengthened health system
institutions

Performance indicators

Empirical methodology

> Access to adjudicative mechanisms for
dispute resolution (including technical,
realistic and perceived access)

> Number of cases heard per year and
percentage of decisions overturned
> Persons using accessibility options
(e.g. translators, phone dial-in)
Wait times for tribunal services

> Quantify and characterize services
provided
> Audit technical and realistic
accessibility by sub-group
> Solicit knowledge and perception of
access among the public
> Access internal performance data

> Perceived legitimacy of adjudicative
decisions

> Public knowledge of the tribunal’s
existence
> Public and stakeholder confidence in
the tribunal’s decision-making

> Solicit knowledge and perception among
public, users and relevant experts

> Satisfaction with adjudicative services

> Satisfaction with the tribunal’s appeal/
review process
> Satisfaction with execution of the process

> Survey and/or interviews of users and
stakeholders

> Perceived fairness and legitimacy of
adjudicative services

> Public confidence in the fairness and
legitimacy of tribunal operations

> Solicit perceptions of fairness and
legitimacy among public, users and
relevant experts

> Interaction among health system
institutions and decision-makers

> Partnerships between the tribunal and
others
> Joint ventures co-led by the tribunal
and others
> Exchanges of information

> Audit of formal collaborations between
tribunals and others
> Interviews with tribunal staff and
primary decision-makers

> Existence of support mechanisms for
health primary decision-makers

> Educational initiatives and opportunities
> Services targeting primary decision-makers

> Audit of initiatives and services
targeting primary decision-makers
> Perceived utility of the tribunal among
primary decision-makers
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Equity, justice and fairness in
health decision-making

Surrogate endpoints
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Table 3. (Continued)

Better health services and
patient safety via enhanced
regulation and oversight

Surrogate endpoints

Performance indicators

Empirical methodology

> Effective oversight of primary health
decision-makers

> Percentage of decisions overturned
> Direction provided for better decisionmaking (either explicitly or implicitly)

> Access internal performance data
> Audit appeal/review processes
> Solicit perceived impact of setting
standards and expectations among
primary decision-makers

> Better decisions by primary health
decision-makers

> Audit a sample of decisions
> Number of cases in which primary
decisions appropriately exercised their
statutory authority and did not exceed it

> Respect for the tribunal’s oversight
function

> Perceived concern or fear among
primary health decision-makers that
their decisions will be reversed

> Survey, interview or focus groups to
uncover perception of tribunals among
primary decision-makers and the
consequences of reversed decisions

Note: The intervention to be examined in this evaluation matrix is the operation and services of Ontario’s health-related adjudicative tribunals as part of the
health system. The population under study is assumed to be Ontario residents in general and the users of the health-related adjudicative tribunals specifically,
and the system goal is to promote better health among Ontarians through a strong health system that provides excellent health services. The counterfactual in
this scenario would be the situation if Ontario’s health system did not have any adjudicative tribunals. The primary target audience for this evaluation is
assumed to be government officials.
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Targeted outcomes

Adjudicative tribunals in the health sector 167

Such benchmarks can be drawn from thoughtful consideration, aspirational goals
of leaders, expert judgments on what is possible, data from similar tribunals in
other jurisdictions (i.e. comparative analysis) or previous empirical observations
from the same tribunal (i.e. interrupted time-series analysis). For experimental
methods like randomized controlled trials that are rarer in socio-legal studies,
the control group would serve as the comparative benchmark rather than any
observational data that are external to the evaluation. Such comparisons are
naturally better because they more accurately represent the counterfactual of
what the situation would be like without the tribunal and can help lead to causal
inferences.
However, overcoming the identified challenges and systematizing empirical
impact evaluations of health-related adjudicative tribunals across time and
jurisdictions require action from stakeholders throughout the health and legal
systems. For example, scholars in the health law field must intensify their efforts
to build capacity for utilizing empirical methodologies, enhance the status of
such work within legal circles and overcome any real or perceived problems
with maintaining independence. Health system institutions should also start to
build policy-relevant databases that are rigorously compiled, comprehensive and
publicly accessible. Finally, health planners and research funders must facilitate (or
even catalyze) the continuous improvement of adjudicative tribunals by supporting
undertakings to empirically evaluate their impact on society. Initial funding for
small-scale evaluations and/or pilot projects would be particularly helpful, as
would support for disseminating any lessons learned as widely as possible.
Syntheses of research evidence may be helpful in encouraging stakeholders to
support empirical impact evaluations of health-related adjudicative tribunals,
especially because they are likely to highlight the current dearth of knowledge in
this area. A systematic review on the effect of adjudicative tribunals in the health
sector, for example, would be a disciplined and rigorous approach to assess the
current state of research evidence in this area and tracking developments in it
over time (Lavis et al., 2004; Petticrew and Roberts, 2008). This tool applies the
scientific method to gathering, appraising and synthesizing what is known (and
what is not known) on a particular topic such that publication and selection bias
are limited (Lavis et al., 2005; Rothstein et al., 2005). Such a review has already
been conducted, for example, to assess the impact of drug courts on criminal
recidivism (Wilson et al., 2006), and a protocol has been developed to evaluate
the influence of these specialist courts on narcotics use in particular and criminal
activity more broadly (Wilson et al., 2007). User-friendly scoping reviews may
also be extremely helpful for pushing this agenda forward in various contexts.
Conclusion
In summary, adjudicative tribunals serve an essential function within the health
sector, yet their contributions and impact on the delivery of health services and
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society in general are not usually evaluated empirically. The focus of past tribunal assessments on their internal operations to the near-total exclusion of
their external impact limit these bodies’ ability to inform continuous quality
improvement efforts, enhance the public’s confidence in them and maximize
their societal impact. Three challenges, however, serve to complicate empirical
impact evaluations of health-related adjudicative tribunals. First, the complexity
of the health system and its countless independent actors prevents their
mechanistic isolation, which is necessary to elegantly find causal inferences
between them and their goals. Second, the indirect relationship between tribunal
services and their existential purposes – exacerbated by uncertain objectives,
difficulties with randomization and a lack of examples to follow – presents
methodological barriers that cannot be easily overcome. Third, several realities
of the legal profession and the environment in which tribunals currently operate
further hinder evaluation efforts, including the dearth of empirical capacity,
culture of deference to authority and focus on process and independence.
There are, however, two main reasons for optimism. Empirical evaluations of
similar judicial bodies have been previously conducted and there is currently a
rapid expansion of interest in empirical health law scholarship. This analysis of
challenges to empirically evaluate the impact of adjudicative tribunals in the
health sector highlights several potential ways to help move this agenda forward. Individual evaluators, for example, can assemble interdisciplinary teams,
identify their tribunal’s overall goal, develop surrogate endpoints and conduct a
realistic evaluation that tracks each of them. Stakeholders within the health and
legal systems, on the other hand, can support individual efforts by earmarking
funds for such empirical impact evaluations, by building policy-relevant databases and by assisting with cross-jurisdictional learning and dissemination
efforts. Syntheses of the research evidence on this topic, and systematic reviews
in particular, may be helpful for highlighting the absence of knowledge in this
area and for building support to capitalize on this otherwise missed opportunity.
Nevertheless, a preliminary question remains as to whether it is even the
responsibility of adjudicative tribunals like Ontario’s HPARB and HSARB to be
empirically evaluating their own impact or to help others in doing so. Besides
the limitations imposed upon them by their respective statutory mandates, these
bodies and others may not necessarily be concerned about the impact of their
decisions and could in fact be preoccupied with maintaining their independence.
Further consideration must be given to these issues, and others, so that continuous
quality improvement and self-evaluation can become part of tribunals’ core
mandates as has been widely promoted for all government undertakings
(Mayne, 2001); otherwise, it may be impossible for these bodies to provide the
best services possible to their users, stakeholders and larger constituencies. Any
ambitions for self-improvement among health-related adjudicative tribunals,
however, must obviously be balanced with the legislative, political and social
realities within which they operate.
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